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SUMMARY Location sharing services have recently gained momen-
tum over mobile online social networks (mOSNs), seeing the increasing
popularity of GPS-capable mobile devices such as smart phones. Despite
the convenience brought by location sharing, there comes severe privacy
risks. Though many efforts have been made to protect user privacy dur-
ing location sharing, many of them rely on the extensive deployment of
trusted Cellular Towers (CTs) and some incur excessive time overhead.
More importantly, little research so far can support complete privacy in-
cluding location privacy, identity privacy and social relation privacy. We
propose SAM, a new System Architecture for mOSNs, and P3S, a Privacy-
Preserving Protocol based on SAM, to address the above issues for privacy-
preserving location sharing over mOSNs. SAM and P3S differ from previ-
ous work in providing complete privacy for location sharing services over
mOSNs. Theoretical analysis and extensive experimental results demon-
strate the feasibility and efficiency of the proposed system and protocol.
key words: privacy-preserving protocol, location sharing, mOSNs, system
architecture
1. Introduction
Mobile online social networks (mOSNs) are widely used in
various applications to support next generation social net-
works that provide easy accessibility and location-aware
services [1].
With the wide adoption of GPS-capable mobile de-
vices, people can now easily exchange ideas, current sta-
tuses, and locations with their friends at real-time through
mOSNs. The technological shift of the mobile Internet from
the traditional 2nd generation network (2G) to the faster
3rd and 4th generation networks (3G and 4G) have fur-
ther motivate tremendous traditional social network applica-
tions, such as Weibo∗ and Twitter∗∗, to transit towards pro-
viding location-based service (LBS). Along with this tran-
sition process, location sharing, as the fundamental means
of enabling people to share their locations with designated
friends, has always been a critical building block of imple-
menting LBSs over mOSNs. For example, Foursquare∗∗∗ is
one of the most popular geosocial service providers that al-
low users to register their current locations and share their
location information with nearby friends or strangers [2].
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According to a recent report [3], LBS is envisioned to be-
come an over 10-billion-per-year business by the year 2017.
Despite the convenience brought by location sharing in
mOSNs, however, there comes an indispensable risk of pri-
vacy. Most location-sharing applications require updating
users’ location information to provide better services with-
out considering the related privacy issue. This raise the pos-
sibility of disclosing users’ location information [4]. For ex-
ample, users usually need to disclose their identity and loca-
tion information to obtain personalized location-based ser-
vices. Location privacy violation usually puts users in many
potentially unpleasant situations such as unwanted adver-
tisements, spams, or adversary tracking of users’ daily life
by malicious parties. For example, the disclosed informa-
tion might reveal a user’s private activities such as visiting a
bank or going to a hospital and be used for targeted adver-
tisements against users’ willingness [5]; a user’s trajectory
may be inferred by the location server based on the user’s
identity, which can be analyzed from its social relationship
(friends’ information). All the above risks suggest an urgent
need of protecting user privacy for location-sharing services
in mOSNs.
Although the privacy issue has received much atten-
tion in recent years regarding location sharing services over
mOSNs [6]–[28], many of them rely on the extensive de-
ployment of trusted Cellular Towers (CTs), whose deploy-
ment, however, is generally unfeasible in the real world. In
addition, some of the previous work incur excessive time
overhead, especially in the transmission process. More im-
portantly, most of the previous work protect user privacy
from just a single perspective and little research so far can
support full-scale privacy. To cover the complete privacy
of users in this study, we identify three requirements of the
privacy-preserving location sharing over mOSNs:
• Location Privacy: the current location of a user should
not be tracked by any unauthorized parties including
service providers.
• Identity Privacy: users’ identities should be com-
pletely hidden from the location server.
• Social Relationship Privacy: users’ friends informa-
tion should be completely hidden from the location
server.
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sponding privacy-preserving protocol to address the above
challenges for the privacy-preserving location sharing over
mOSNs. Distinguishing from the previous work, our ap-
proach features a complete privacy protection for location
sharing services over mOSNs. In a nutshell, we make the
following contributions:
(1) We propose SAM, a new System Architecture for
mOSNs, to provide the infrastructural support for com-
plete privacy protection. Compared with existing work,
our system not only deploys single location server
(LS), but also requires no CTs.
(2) We propose P3S, a Privacy-Preserving Protocol based
on SAM, to achieve the complete privacy protection
for location sharing services over mOSNs. P3S outper-
forms the previous work in the following three aspects:
– P3S provides a high level of location privacy pro-
tection. In particular, a fake location genera-
tion scheme combining two algorithms has been
proposed to avoid generating ‘stupid fake loca-
tions’, i.e., locations where a person rarely goes
to? Though a ‘stupid fake locations’ can easily
be identified, none of the previous work can avoid
generating ‘stupid fake locations’.
– P3S can provide social relation privacy protection
by a social relation concealment scheme based
on the bloom filter. Specifically, the SNS adds
a user’s friend list into the bloom filter, which
is then sent to the LS. In this way, LS can fil-
ter strangers and find the friends of a user by the
bloom filter, without needing to know the exact
friend information of the user.
– P3S supports many more functions. P3S can sup-
port not only nearby friends and strangers search
which is also supported by existing work, but
also support real-time location sharing between
friends.
(3) We prove the effectiveness of the proposed approach
in preserving the location privacy, identity privacy, and
social relationship privacy under the security architec-
ture of SAM. Extensive experimental results demon-
strate the feasibility (in terms of both execution effi-
ciency and convenience) of applying the proposed ap-
proach on the current mobile devices.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
The related work is discussed in Sect. 2. We introduce the
SAM architecture and the corresponding threat model in
Sect. 3. Section 4 presents P3S, the privacy-preserving pro-
tocol in detail, followed by the security analysis in Sect. 5.
Section 6 reports the experimental results, and finally, we
give some concluding remarks in Sect. 7.
2. Related Work
Privacy protection has received tremendous attention in
recent years for mOSNs, such as privacy strengthening
during propagation [29] and privacy-preserving text analy-
sis [30]. As location-sharing becomes an increasingly sig-
nificant service, especially in the mobile online social net-
work, the privacy issue caused by location-sharing has de-
veloped into a devil of a tricky problem. In order to ad-
dress this issue, many researches about information pri-
vacy [31], [32] and location privacy protection [33], [34]
have been done. There are a number of works focus-
ing on preventing the location server from learning users’
locations when users access the location-based services.
The K-anonymity [11], [12], the mix zones [13], [14], the
pseudonym methods [15], [16], the m-unobservability [17]
and the location anonymity [18], [19] are the typical solu-
tions. Moreover, some people investigated privacy preser-
vation policies about location privacy in distributed social
network [20], [21]. Besides, in order to defend against var-
ious inference attacks based on differential privacy, Xiao
et al. [22] have presented a systematic solution to preserve
location privacy. And Sun et al. [23] have introduced a
location-label based approach for location-aware location
privacy protection problem. Aiming at the same problem,
Wang et al. presented [24] several efficient heuristics. In ad-
dition, Li et al. [25], [26] and Rahman et al. [27] have pro-
posed privacy context obfuscation to obscure location infor-
mation based on data requester, time of day, and so on.
In 2007, earlier researchers Cox et al. [28] introduced a
representative mechanism for location sharing between both
trusted social friends and untrusted strangers. Subsequently,
an improved system MobiShare [6] provides flexible pri-
vacy protection for location sharing services in mOSNs by
accessing users’ location information through a location
server. This design allows users to share their location in-
formation but meanwhile avoids both SNS providers and
the location server from having the complete knowledge of
a user’s identity and location. However, Mobishare relies
on the extensive deployment of trusted CTs, which can be
difficult to implement in the real world. Also, Mobishare
cannot achieve the identity privacy as it cannot prevent the
location server from linking the queries from the same user
to extract sensitive information. N-MobiShare [7] improves
Mobishare by assuming CTs as non-core components of the
system and forwarding update requests of user locations to
the location server instead of CTs to avoid the extensive
deployment of CTs. This approach, however, cannot pre-
serve social relationship privacy as location server can ob-
tain a user’s friend list in the query phrase. MobiShare+ [8]
aims to address the social relationship privacy by building n-
degree polynomials to filter users’ real friends. However, it
is still possible for the location server to obtain users’ friend
lists because the fake identifiers of a user are already indi-
cated by the common set of zero points in the correspond-
ing n-degree polynomial. In addition, MobiShare+ incurs
excessive time overhead, especially during the transmission
process.
To improve transmission efficiency, BMobiShare [9]
adopted Bloom Filter to replace the private set intersection
protocol in MobiShare+. Whenever a user queries a nearby
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friend’ location in BMobiShare, the user sent a real query
along with k-1 dummy queries to the SNS. Since the final
result set returned to the user is the merge of the k result sets
that satisfy respectively the totally k queries, the final re-
sult set actually includes the real user’s friends located both
around the real user and around the k-1 dummy users and
therefore is inaccurate. Recently, a new architecture that
employs with multiple location servers [10] is proposed to
support the location sharing between friends and strangers
in location-based applications. The introduction of multiple
location servers lowers the degree of knowledge of each in-
dividual server on a user, but at the same time, adds to the
difficulty of location privacy protection by making it pos-
sible for the location servers to collude, which is likely to
happen typically when these servers are owned by the same
service provider.
To summarize, though many efforts have been made to
protect user’s privacy for the location sharing in mOSNs,
none of the previous work can protect the complete privacy
of users with respect to the location privacy, identity privacy,
and social relationship privacy at the same time. That forms
the major motivation of our study in this paper.
3. System Architecture and Threat Model
In this section, we describe the system architecture and
threat model as the foundation of our approach. A summary
of the notations used in this paper is listed in Table 1.
3.1 System Architecture
The basic components of SAM (Fig. 1) include mobile
users, a social network server (SNS), and a location server
(LS), where SNS and LS store users’ profile (including user
identities and social relations such as friend lists) and lo-
cation information, respectively. The separate storage of
users’ profile and location information provides the basic
support for preventing the linkage between the two types
of information, i.e., SNS cannot obtain users’ real locations
while LS cannot infer the users’ identities and social rela-
tions. We introduce each component of SAM as follows:
• Mobile users. Every user can register to the social net-
work with their personal information and obtain their
unique identities. They can then communicate with
both SNS and LS via GPS-enabled mobile devices to
enjoy various location sharing services.
• SNS. The social network server is deployed and man-
aged by the social network provider such as Face-
book or Weibo. SNS stores the users’ personal profiles
and protects the user privacy by anonymizing its iden-
tity, concealing its social relations, and generating fake
locations.
• LS. The location sharing server manages user locations
and supports the retrieval of nearby locations of users.
We configure the three components as follows to
support complete privacy protection:
• Each user, say u, generates its own public/private key
pair (puk u, prk u). Then, it shares the public key
puk u with SNS and LS, and its symmetric key sk u,
named ‘friend key’ with its friends. Specifically, two
users who are friends, say u and v, exchange their
‘friend keys’ following these steps: first, SNS sends
puk v to u; then, u encrypts sk u by puk v and sends
the encrypted key to v through SNS; finally, v decrypts
the encrypted key by its private key and obtains sk u.
In a similar way, u can obtain sk v.
• The SNS is pre-loaded with a public/private key pair
(puk S , prk S ), a hash function H, and a bloom fil-
ter B. Then, the SNS shares its puk S with the LS
and all the registered users, followed by its generating
the pseudo-IDs and real/fake location tags using H and
concealing of the social relations using the bloom filter.
In particular, a bloom filter, without having a set of m
elements, is a data structure which can efficiently de-
termine whether an element is possibly a member of a
set or not. A bloom filter consists of two components:
a set of p independent hash functions, {hi()|1 ≤ i ≤ p},
and an array of e bits, D[e], all initialized to 0. Each
hash function returns a value that maps to a position in
D[e], say yi, satisfying yi < e. A bloom filter supports
two basic operations: adding and query. To add an el-
ement, say f ∈ FR, to a bloom filter, p hash functions
are used to generate p indices into the array with the
corresponding bits of the array all set to 1. A query is
positive if all p referenced bits are 1 while a negative
query indicates that the element is not in the bloom fil-
ter. Specifically in our system, the SNS uses the bloom
filter to record a user’s friend set FR and send it to the
LS. To check whether an element, say f , exists in FR,
LS simply applies the p hash-functions on f to gener-
ate p values and concludes that f doesn’t belong to FR
if any of the p indices in the bit array D[e] is set to 0
(otherwise, f belongs to FR). In this way, the bloom
filter allows for the checking of users’ friendship rela-
tions without letting LS know the exact elements of the
friend set FR.
• The LS is pre-loaded its public/private key pair
(puk L, prk L). Then, LS shares its puk L with SNS
and the user.
3.2 Threat Model
We assume three sources of privacy violation caused by a
malicious user, honest but curious SNS, and honest but cu-
rious LS, respectively, to form a strong threat model.
• Malicious user
A malicious user usually obtains a target user’s identity
and location information by performing unauthorized
operations. We assume that a malicious user may col-
lude with the SNS or LS while a user’s friends who will
never collude with the SNS or LS to acquire the user’s
sensitive information.
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Table 1 Notations
Notation Description
IDu Identity of user u
PIDu Pseudo identity of u
sku A symmetric key, named ‘friend key’ shared between u and its friends
(puk u, prk u) u’s public/private key pair
Ek(p) Encrypt data p by key k
F u’s friend set including its friends’ information
d fu The distance within which u would like to share its location with friends
dsu The distance within which u would like to share its location with strangers
sigu u’s signature
lu u’s real location
tag i The location tag which is used to identify whether the i-th location is real or not.
Fig. 1 System architecture.
• Honest but curious SNS
We assume the SNS generally follows the protocol but
may attempt to obtain users’ location information at-
tracted the potential business benefits held by com-
bining user identity and trajectory information. Also,
we assume the LS and SNS do not collude as that
would make the threat model too strong to be beaten in
practice.
• Honest but curious LS
We assume the LS generally follows the protocol but
may attempt to obtain users’ identity and trajectory for
the same reasons as the SNS.
4. Privacy-Preserving Protocol Based on SAM
The privacy-preserving protocol based on SAM (P3S) aims
to manage user identity and social relation information sep-
arately by SNS and LS, while prevent them from obtain-
ing user information from each other. P3S includes five
sub-protocols: user registration, location update, nearby
friends query, nearby strangers query, and real-time location
sharing.
4.1 User Registration
Before using a location sharing service, a mobile user, say
u, has to register by providing its personal profile and friend
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Fig. 2 Data storage structure of SNS.
information to the SNS. The registration process (Fig. 3) is
as follows:
1. User u sends a registration request to the SNS.
2. SNS replies to u by returning a message < UR, IDu,
puk S >, where UR denotes the message type, IDu is
a unique ID assigned by the SNS to u.
3. u sends a message < UR, puk u, FR, d fu, dsu > to the
SNS, where FR = {IDu,i|1 ≤ i ≤ M} is the friend set
of u, M is the total number of friends of u, IDu,i is the
ID of the i-th friend of u, d fu and dsu are the distances
within which u would like to share its locations with
friends and strangers, respectively.
4. u exchanges its ‘friend key’ with all its friends by the
method introduced in Sect. 3.1.
5. SNS inserts u’s personal profile into the user informa-
tion table (Fig. 2) and friend information into u’s friend
information table (Fig. 2).
4.2 Location Update
The location update sub-protocol aims to conceal users’ real
identities from the LS, which might infer their identities
based on their locations or trajectory information, whenever
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Fig. 3 User registration.
Algorithm 1 Fake Trajectories Generation
Input: Tp, spot // Tp (See Fig. 2) is the fake trajectories table. spot
is u’s current location.
Output: Tp
1: x=Trajectoryid(Tp) // Trajectoryid(Tp) returns the number of
trajectories in Tp
2: y=Locationid(IDu,Tp) // Locationid(IDu,Tp) is used to find
whether part of u’s history trajectory is recorded in Tp. If u exists
in Tp, Locationid(IDu,Tp) returns the number of u’s history locations
recorded in Tp. If u does not exist in Tp, Locationid(IDu,Tp)=-1
3: if x < n then
4: Insert(IDu, spot, Tp) // Insert u’s location to Tp
5: end if
6: return Tp
users need to update their location information in the LS
(e.g., when they move to new places).
The location update sub-protocol works as follows:
first, users encrypt and send their current locations to the
SNS; Then, the SNS anonymizes user identities; Finally, the
SNS generates k-1 fake locations and sends k locations (in-
cluding one real and k − 1 fake ones) to the LS to mislead
the LS. The above procedure still faces three challenges:
a) How to prevent the SNS from inferring the users’ real
locations?
b) How to avoid generating ‘stupid fake locations’, i.e.,
locations where a person rarely goes to? Though
‘stupid fake locations’ can easily be identified, none
of the previous work can avoid generating ‘stupid fake
locations’.
c) How to avoid generating ‘stupid fake trajectories’,
which include ‘stupid fake locations’ and cannot fit
user movements in the real world? Similar to ‘stupid
fake locations’, the previous work can identify yet
cannot prevent ‘stupid fake trajectories’ from being
Algorithm 2 Fake Locations Generation
Input: Tp, F[k − 1] // Tp is the fake trajectories table (See Fig. 2).
F[k − 1] is used to store the information about the k − 1 fake loca-
tions. Specifically, F[i].tra jectoryid, F[i].locationid and F[i].spot are
the trajectoryid (See Fig. 2), locationid and the i-th fake location re-
spectively, where 0 ≤ i < k − 1.
Output: F[k − 1]
1: if Empty(F[k−1]) then // u updates its location for the first time
2: for i = 0; i < k − 1; i + + do // Choose k − 1 different fake
trajectories randomly from table Tp.
3: a = 1
4: while a == 1 do
5: x = rand(1, n)
6: a = 0
7: for j = 0; j < i; j + + do // Make sure that the x-th
fake trajectory has never been selected before.
8: if F[ j].tra jectoryid == x then





14: F[i].tra jectoryid = x // Choose a location randomly
from the x-th fake trajectory in table Tp.
15: y = rand(1,m)
16: F[i].locationid = y
17: F[i].spot =GetLocation(x, y,Tp) // GetLocation(x, y,Tp)
returns the location whose trajectoryid and locationid are x and y re-
spectively in table Tp.
18: end for
19: else
20: for i = 0; i < k−1; i++ do // Update k−1 fake locations for
u.
21: x = F[i].tra jectoryid
22: y = mod[(F[i].locationid+1)/m] // Choose the i-th fake
location from the same fake trajectory one by one in order
23: F[i].locationid = y
24: F[i].spot =GetLocation(x, y,Tp)
25: end for
26: end if
27: return F[k − 1]
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Fig. 4 Location update.
generated.
The location update sub-protocol address the above
challenges as follows: 1) each user u needs to send en-
crypted locations, say spot, instead of its original locations,
say lu, to the SNS, where spot = Epuk L(lu, Esk u(lu)), to ad-
dress challenge a); 2) a Fake LOcation geneRaTion scheme
named FLORT is employed to to deal with challenge b) and
c). FLORT generates fake locations based on the real trajec-
tories of users—it first records users’ historical trajectories
and generates a fake trajectories table (Fig. 2) with n fake
trajectories; and then the SNS selects k − 1 trajectories from
the table by Algorithm 1; finally, the SNS generates k − 1
fake locations from the selected trajectories by Algorithm 2.
In particular, a fake trajectories table (Fig. 2) has n rows
and m columns, where both n and m are predefined. Each
row records a historical trajectory containing m continuous
locations of a user. The SNS updates a fix portion of trajec-
tories in the fake trajectories table on a regular basis, e.g.,
10 percent of the fake trajectories by Algorithm 1. Fake
trajectories are generated in a way that repeats some of the
historical trajectories of users in the fake trajectories table—
k−1 historical trajectories are randomly selected when a user
updates its location for the first time, and then for each loca-
tion update of the user, the next location in each of the k − 1
historical trajectories is used as a fake location.
The location update sub-protocol is detailed as follows
(Fig. 4), which is a 7-step procedure:
1 Once u moves to a new place lu, it sends to
the SNS a location update notification message <
LU, spot, t, sigu >, where LU, spot, t and sigu are the
message type, encrypted location, timestamp, and user
Table 2 Location information
User pseudo-ID Location Encrypted location Location tag
PIDu loc 1 Esk u(loc 1) tag 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PIDu loc k Esk u(loc k) tag k
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
signature, respectively. Specifically, spot is of the form
Epuk L(lu, Esk u(lu)), the timestamp is used to defend
against replay attack, and the signature is of the form
Eprk u(IDu, t).
2 SNS verifies sigu.
3 SNS generates a unique pseudo-ID, PIDu = H(IDu⊕t′)
for u, where t′ is the timestamp.
4 SNS generates k − 1 fake locations using Algorithm 2.
5 SNS generates k location tags, {tag i|1 ≤ i ≤ k},
to identify the real location from those fake ones: if
tag i = H(IDu), the location related with tag i is real;
if tag i = H(IDu ⊕ i), the related location is fake.
6 SNS sends a message < LU, PIDu, {spot i, tag i|1 ≤
i ≤ k}, d fu, dsu, t, sigS > containing k locations to the
LS, where spot i and tag i are the i-th location and its
corresponding tag, respectively. Specifically, spot i =
Epuk L(loc i, Esk u(loc i)) and sigS = Eprk S (PIDu, t).
7 By decrypting {spot i|1 ≤ i ≤ k} from the
received message, the LS obtains k locations
{(loc i, Esk u(loc i)|1 ≤ i ≤ k} and stores them in Ta-
ble 2.
Note that the location updates may produce an infinite
number of pseudo-IDs as each location update comes with a
new pseudo-ID. Therefore, the LS regularly removes old en-
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Fig. 5 Nearby friends query.
tries from the location information table to avoid excessive
storage.
4.3 Nearby Friends Query
The nearby friends query sub-protocol aims to complete
users’ location requests without leaking their privacy. The
sub-protocol focuses on addressing two challenging issues:
1) how to conceal the user identity and social relations from
the LS? 2) how to protect the user locations from the SNS?
Basically, a social relation concealment scheme based
on the bloom filter has been proposed to protect the user’s
friends’ information. Specifically, the SNS adds a user’s
friend list into the bloom filter B, which is then sent to the
LS. In this way, LS can filter strangers and find the friends
of a user by B, without needing to know the exact friend
information of the user.
The nearby friends query sub-protocol (Fig. 5) follows
12 steps to query the nearby friends of a user u:
1. u sends a request message < NFQ, IDu, t, sigu > to the
SNS, where NQF is the message type.
2. SNS verifies sigu.
3. SNS generates the bloom filter B that includes the
friend information of u.
4. SNS sends a query message < NFQ, PIDu, B, t, sigS >
to the LS.
5. LS retrieves k locations of PIDu, say {li|1 ≤ i ≤ k}.
6. For each location, say li, LS finds u’s friends around
li by B and obtains a set Ni. Each element of Ni is of
the form (PIDv, Esk v(lv), tag v), satisfying the distance
between lv and li is less than min{d fu, d fv}.
7. LS sends all the nearby friends, < NFQ, PIDu, {Ni|1 ≤
i ≤ k}, t, sigL >, to the SNS, where sigL =
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Fig. 6 Nearby strangers query.
Eprk L(PIDu, t).




9. SNS deletes the erroneous results (i.e., strangers) from
N
′
i according to u’s friend information table (Fig. 2) and
thereby obtains the real friend set N
′′
i .
10. SNS replaces each pseudo-ID in {N ′′i |1 ≤ i ≤ k} with
the corresponding real ID and thereby obtains Nu =
{IDj, Esk j(l j)|1 ≤ j ≤ q}, where q is the number of u’s
nearby friends.
11. SNS sends Nu to u.
12. u decrypts Nu and obtains the real locations of its
friends nearby.
4.4 Nearby Strangers Query
The nearby strangers query sub-protocol (Fig. 6) performs
the following steps to find the strangers around a user while
protecting its privacy:
1. u sends a request message < NS Q, IDu, t, sigu > to the
SNS, where NS Q is the message type.
2. SNS verifies sigu.
3. SNS sends a request message < NS Q, PIDu, t, sigS >
to the LS.
4. LS finds k locations of PIDu, say {li|1 ≤ i ≤ k}.
5. For each location li, LS finds the people around li and
obtains a set Si. Each element of Si is of the form
(PIDv, Esk v(lv), tag v), satisfying the distance between
lv and li is less than min{dsu, dsv}.
6. LS sends < NS Q, PIDu, {Si|1 ≤ i ≤ k}, t, sigL > that
contains strangers around u to the SNS.




8. SNS deletes u’s friends from S
′
i according to u’s friend




9. For each pseudo-ID in {S′′i |1 ≤ i ≤ k}, SNS replaces
it with the corresponding real ID and thereby obtains
Su = {IDj, Epuk u(l j)|1 ≤ j ≤ Q}, where Q is the num-
ber of u’s nearby strangers.
10. SNS sends Su to u.
11. u decrypts Su and obtains the real locations of its nearby
strangers.
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Fig. 7 Real-time location sharing.
4.5 Real-Time Location Sharing
The real-time location sharing sub-protocol (Fig. 7) per-
forms the following steps to complete the real-time location
sharing between two friends (e.g., u and v):
1. u sends a request message < RLS , IDu, IDv, t, sigu > to
the SNS, where LS is the message type.
2. SNS verifies sigu.
3. SNS sends a request message < RLS , Epuk v(IDu), t,
sigs > to v.
4. v responds to the SNS with a message < RLS , agree, t,
sigv >, where sigv = Eprk v(agree, t), if it agrees to
share its location in real-time with u.
5. SNS sends a message < RLS , PIDu, PIDv, t, sigs > to
the LS to request for the locations of u and v.
6. LS obtains Lu and Lv from Table 2, where Lu and Lv
include k encrypted locations and location tags of PIDu
and PIDv, respectively.
7. LS sends Lu and Lv to the SNS.
8. SNS deletes the fake locations in Lu and Lv and thereby
obtains u’s real location L
′
u = Esk u(lu) and v’s real
location L
′
v = Esk v(lv).
9. SNS sends L
′
v to u.
10. SNS sends L
′
u to v.
Note that some operations may still need to be per-
formed during the real-time location sharing process be-
tween two friends (e.g., u and v): once a person u changes its
location, the SNS needs to perform the location update sub-
protocol (introduced in Sect. 4.2), send a location request
message to the LS, and return the result to v. Specially, no
location will be sent to any of the two people by the SNS
when a person stops sharing its real-time location with a
friend.
5. Security Analysis
We analyse the security performance of SAM and P3S from
three aspects: location privacy, identity privacy and social
relationship privacy.
5.1 Location Privacy
The proposed approach can protect users’ location privacy
for the following reasons:
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• SNS cannot obtain the users’ real locations for two rea-
sons: 1) each location sent by a user to the SNS is
encrypted by the public key of the LS; 2) each loca-
tion sent by the LS to the SNS is encrypted by a user’s
‘friend key’.
• Without the location tag, the LS cannot identify a
user’s real location from the fake ones for two reasons:
1) each location tag is computed by a user’s real ID,
which the LS does not know; 2) it is difficult for the LS
to infer the real location from k − 1 fake locations as
fake locations are generated from real historical trajec-
tories in P3S.
• A malicious user cannot obtain the target user’s real lo-
cations even if it colludes with either the SNS or the
LS— the malicious user can only obtain the locations
encrypted by the target user’s ‘friend key’ rather than
the target user’s original locations through the collu-
sion with the SNS; similarly, it can neither identify the
target user nor obtain the user’s real location from the
LS’s databases (which requires knowing the user’s real
ID) through collusion with the LS.
5.2 Identity Privacy and Social Relationship Privacy
The proposed approach can protect users’ identity privacy
and social relationship privacy for the following reasons:
• LS cannot obtain a user’s identity and social relations
for two reasons: 1) LS cannot infer a user’s real ID,
as each location query sent to the LS uses different
pseudo-IDs even for the same users; 2) LS cannot ob-
tain a user’s social relations as the LS uses the bloom
filter rather than the real friend list to find the user’s
friends.
• A malicious user cannot infer the target user’s ID
through collusion with the LS, even though they can
find the user’s pseudo-IDs according to the target user’s
real locations.
6. Implementation and Evaluation
We examined the acceptability and feasibility of P3S on mo-
bile devices, which are generally more resource-constrained
when compared with wired devices. The cryptographic op-
erations performed on mobile phones in P3S involve sym-
metric encryption and decryption, asymmetric encryption
and decryption, signature, and verification. Therefore, we
chose AES with 128-bit keys in CBC mode for the sym-
metric cryptography and RSA with 2048-bit length keys for
both asymmetric cryptography and signature. All exper-
iments are executed on Huawei NEM-AL10 smart phone
running Android 6.0 operation system with a 2.0GHZ CPU.
Specifically, AES, RSA and signature is implemented by
the android cryptography class javax.crypto.cipher which is
provided by Android SDK. We obtain the location of the
mobile device by the getLastKnownLocation() function pro-
vided by the LocationManager class.
Fig. 8 AES decryption time
Fig. 9 RSA decryption time
Fig. 10 Encryption execution time
Figures 8 and 9 show the average time for data de-
cryption with AES and RSA, respectively. The results in
Fig. 8 show that AES takes more time on decryption as the
number of nearby friends of a user grows. Given 30 friends
around the user, we observed no more than 35ms taken by
AES, which is acceptable within current mobile environ-
ment. Similarly, we observed from Fig. 9 that RSA took a
longer time for decryption as the number of strangers nearby
increased. When the number of strangers around the user
was 30, the time cost for RSA was still less than 300ms.
We also tested the average time for encrypting data
with AES and RSA (Fig. 10). The results show that the en-
cryption time required by RSA and AES increases as the
number of location update requests grows, and RSA takes
more time to encrypt data than AES. On the other hand, the
performance of both encryption methods is acceptable, with
both RSA and AES take no more than 100ms to encrypt data
when there are as many as 40 location update requests from
a single person.
We further studied the signing and verifying operations
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on a 128-bytes data set by experiments. As we can see from
Fig. 11, the time cost for signature and verification grows
as the number of 128-bytes data increases. Figure 11 also
indicates the average time needed by one-time signature and
verification is about 2.7ms and 0.8ms which is acceptable
for most mobile phones.
Figure 12 shows the time needed by a user to exchange
his friend key with his friends’ friend keys. It is observed
that the execution time increases almost linearly with the
number of the user’s friends grows. However, even that the
number of friends is as high as 100, the execution time is
less than 1s. Since the friend keys’ exchange process is one-
time, the execution time is acceptable.
We compare our system with three typical location-
sharing systems for mOSN: Mobishare in 2012 [6], N-
Mobishare in 2014 [7], Multi-location servers in 2015 [10]
and our system. Table 3 lists the performances of different
systems.
• About the cellular towers
Different from Mobishare, our system and the other
two typical systems are more flexible since they do not
need cellular towers.
• About the mobile device performance
Mobile devices in the four systems perform similar
Fig. 11 Execution time for signature and verification
Fig. 12 Execution time for ‘friend key’ exchange
Table 3 Performance comparison of different systems
Items Mobishare [6] N-Mobishare [7] Multi-location server [10] Our system
Cellular Tower Need No No No
Mobile Device Similar Similar Similar Similar
SNS Hardware Requirements Low Low High Middle
Number of Location Servers Single Single Multiple Single
Security Middle Low Low High
System function General General General Power f ul
operations such as location computation, data encryp-
tion and decryption operation.
• About the SNS requirements Compared with
Mobishare and N-Mobishare, our system requires a
more powerful social network server to generate fake
locations and conceal the social relationship by bloom
filter. However, the Multi-location server system de-
ploys the most powerful social network server since
it encrypts much more locations which will then be
sent to multiple location server for privacy protection
consideration.
• About the number of Location Servers Mobishare,
N-Mobishare and our system store all of the locations
into single server. On the contrary, the multi-location
server system stores locations to multi-servers.
• About security performance
Our system provides a higher level of security than
other systems. Specifically, our system can achieve the
location privacy, identity privacy and social relation-
ship privacy while others cannot.
• About system functions
Our system supports many more functions than the oth-
ers. Specifically, both our system and the other three
systems can search nearby friends’ and strangers’ loca-
tions. Furthermore, our system can support real-time
location sharing between friends.
The above experimental and evaluation results suggest
that the presented P3S protocol under the SAM system pro-
vides a higher level of security and supports many more
functions than the others. Furthermore, our system is fea-
sible and efficient for use in a general mobile devices.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed SAM, a new system archi-
tecture for mOSNs, and a corresponding privacy-preserving
protocol based on SAM (P3S), as the overall solution to
the privacy protection issue during the location sharing over
mOSNs. Distinguishing from previous approaches, our so-
lution features a full-scale privacy protection of users that
covers location privacy, identity privacy, and social relation-
ship privacy under the strong security architecture of SAM.
Extensive experimental results demonstrate the feasibility
and effectiveness of the proposed approach on the state-of-
the-art mobile devices.
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